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TRANSCRIPT
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN CONSUMER FINANCE:
REMARKS AT THE JAMES R. BROWNING
SYMPOSIUM ON CONSUMER LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY AT ALEXANDER BLEWETT III
SCHOOL OF LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
MONTANA, SEPTEMBER 25, 2020
Richard Cordray*
Thank you for inviting me to the Symposium. I am sorry not to be in
Montana with you, but I have registered my personal complaints about the
pandemic with Professor Cowie, who will, I am sure, take effective action
to address them.
I. INTRODUCTION
My topic today is “Cooperative Federalism in Consumer Finance.”
That is, in fact, an accurate description of the framework now in place for
consumer financial regulation and enforcement, which builds on the invit-
ing scaffold produced by the Dodd-Frank Act.1 In several respects, that
scaffold has provided a robust role for both federal and state officials—
neither to the exclusion of the others—and we will explore the current state
of that interesting relationship further along our way. But I would also like
to proceed more broadly and schematically, by positioning developments in
* First Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and former Ohio attorney general.
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376 (2010) (the portion of the law that concerns consumer financial protection is Title X, which is
known in its own right as the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, is codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 5301-5641).
1
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the field of consumer finance against the history and context of judicial and
political federalism in this country.
To start, I will begin by defining the rather vague phrase “cooperative
federalism” with more specificity. By this I mean two things: both “concur-
rent” federalism and “collegial” federalism. Together, these two approaches
are helping to optimize joint activity toward the objective of ensuring that
consumers are treated fairly in the financial marketplace. Here I will pro-
vide a brief overview as a roadmap of the discussion, and we will return to
reinforce these points at the end.
The spirit of federalism that pervades this area of government action is
“concurrent” in the sense that it preserves the dual spheres of federal and
state action through the distinct mechanisms of standard-setting (legislation
and regulation) and standard-enforcement (litigation and supervision). The
standards guiding private conduct may be established by judges, legislators,
or administrative officials, operating at either level—federal or state. Each
has the authority to operate in parallel with the others.2 Even where the
standards set by federal and state officials may conflict with one another in
some respects, they will be validated and respected as long as they are pur-
sued on behalf of a shared objective: namely, affording more protection to
consumers in the financial marketplace. This is not ordinarily how the rec-
onciliation of federal and state law works, but it reflects an enhanced form
of federalism in this particular field.3
Second, the nature of federalism in this area is also “collegial.” In that
regard, it goes beyond parallel action. If federal officials were able to estab-
lish and enforce federal laws protecting consumers in the financial market-
place, and state officials were able to establish and enforce state laws pro-
tecting those same consumers, the result would be a robust regime with the
aim of maximizing consumer financial protection. But unless those officials
made it a point to collaborate with one another through joint strategic plan-
ning, conscious sharing of information, and working together to address
certain problems of mutual interest, the resulting parallel scheme would fail
to optimize consumer financial protection. Indeed, such collegial action is
2. This gives rise to six distinct potential sources of law: federal statutes (including agency and
court interpretation), federal regulations (including agency and court interpretation), federal common
law, state statutes (including agency and court interpretation), state regulations (including agency and
court interpretation), and state common law. I do not address treaties, which have limited application
here, or constitutional law, which generally imposes limits on government action but does not provide
rules of conduct to govern the private behavior of persons and companies.
3. This description of “concurrent federalism” thus harmonizes with standard principles of pre-
emption analysis as follows. First, it does not involve “express preemption,” which holds that supreme
federal law negates state law whenever Congress explicitly says so (because Congress has not said so).
Second, it does not involve “implied preemption” of state law that conflicts with federal law because
Congress has specified as a “meta-principle” of judicial interpretation that state law may conflict with
federal law if it affords more protection to consumers.
2
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necessary to avoid three problems: (1) conflicting activity that would hinder
officials from achieving their intended goals; (2) uncoordinated activity that
undermines the teamwork needed to make the best use of pooled resources;
and (3) the resulting disrepute from chaotic or failed efforts that would
jeopardize the continued practice of cooperative federalism.4
Take, for example, the federal consumer financial law known as the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).5 This statute sets various
standards for debt collection practices as a matter of federal law. Under the
more recent Dodd-Frank Act, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”) also has the authority to adopt regulations that set federal stan-
dards.6 Other standards for debt collection practices have been prescribed
over the years as a matter of state law—by judicial decision, by statute, and
by regulations imposed on licensees.
How do these federal and state standards relate to one another? We
know because Congress has spoken directly to this point. The FDCPA ex-
pressly articulates that it “does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any
person . . . from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt
collection practices” except where the state laws are inconsistent with the
FDCPA “and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.”7 It then sets up a
system of concurrent federalism by adding as follows: “a State law is not
inconsistent with [the FDCPA] if the protection such law affords any con-
sumer is greater than the protection provided by [the FDCPA].”8 The estab-
lished practice in this area has also reflected “collegial federalism,” insofar
as both the Federal Trade Commission and the CFPB have engaged in joint
investigations and enforcement actions with state attorneys general and
state regulators to address harmful debt collection practices, as well as de-
vised joint strategies for attacking certain problems through regular and pe-
riodic meetings, trainings, hearings, and conferences.9
4. The distinction between “maximizing” and “optimizing” the amount of work done in the field
of consumer finance thus reflects lingering concerns about the kinds of issues that are usually considered
in terms of conflict preemption. It is entirely plausible, for example, that simply expanding activity will
not do more to protect consumers if federal and state officials lack any strategic focus on how to achieve
their shared goal.
5. An Act to amend the Consumer Credit Protection Act to prohibit abusive practices by debt
collectors, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p).
6. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1089(4).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (1977).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Tom Carter, Partners bring more than 100 debt collection actions, CON-
SUMER.FTC.GOV (Nov. 4, 2015), https://perma.cc/XC3B-2VCT (joint action by more than 70 federal,
state, and local government agencies); CFPB Web Team, We’re ordering JP Morgan Chase to refund
$50 million and stop collecting on 528,000 accounts, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (July 8, 2015), https://
perma.cc/6BQV-Z5PK (joint action by CFPB and 48 state attorneys general).
3
Cordray: <em>COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN CONSUMER FINANCE</em>
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2021
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-APR-21 11:03
4 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 82
II. AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY
But now let’s move away from the narrow field of consumer finance,
broaden our lens, and consider how these matters can be squared against a
historical account of American federalism. Is cooperative federalism as I
have just briefly described it a workable doctrine, and is it compatible with
accepted constitutional principles that govern federal-state relations?
Our system of dual sovereignty was devised as an unusual response to
practical necessity—given an existing confederacy of separate states—and
as an experimental departure from previous mechanisms for governing a
large area with a large population. Empire, federation, and alliances of vari-
ous kinds had risen and fallen over many centuries, and the Founders had
canvassed the historical record, which they found wanting in its instabil-
ity.10 So they now sought to undertake something new and more lasting.
They introduced two new conceptual innovations with antecedents in recent
political thinkers: separation of powers and federalism. The latter idea re-
quired them to “split the atom of sovereignty” by establishing a new federal
government alongside a multiplicity of state governments, both operating
on the same citizenry in ways that were certain to spawn conflicts.11 Those
conflicts would require appropriate and consensual resolution through the
courts and peaceful political channels, rather than through violence, revolu-
tion, or open warfare.
To begin with, the concept of the “police power” was recognized as
the basis for states to regulate the behavior of private individuals and en-
force order within their territorial boundaries so as to promote and maintain
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public as a whole.12
This was viewed as a residual power, inherent in the nature of government,
which existed in the states prior to the institution of the federal govern-
ment.13 By contrast, the new central government was granted only enumer-
ated powers and was limited in its ability to dictate constraints on individual
behavior unless expressly authorized to do so in the narrow fields thus enu-
10. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), especially Nos. 6-10 (on extent of union as
safeguarding liberty); Nos. 15-22 (on defects of current confederation and historical antecedents); Nos.
32-33 (on concurrent taxation power and the Supremacy Clause); and Nos. 45-46 (comparison of the
powers of the state and federal governments).
11. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 204–05 (1824) (“In our complex system, presenting the rare and
difficult scheme of one general government, whose action extends over the whole, but which possesses
only certain enumerated powers; and of numerous State governments, which retain and exercise all
powers not delegated to the Union, contests respecting power must arise.”).
12. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“[T]he police power of a state
must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enact-
ment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”).
13. Id. at 25 (“[T]he police power [is] a power which the state did not surrender when becoming a
member of the Union under the Constitution.”).
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 82 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol82/iss1/1
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-1\MON101.txt unknown Seq: 5  2-APR-21 11:03
2021 COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN CONSUMER FINANCE 5
merated (and as later extended through interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause).14
The manner of setting binding standards for citizens to follow was not
entirely spelled out in either the federal or the state constitutions. Both es-
tablished the procedures for exercising legislative power, which is the over-
arching source of rules controlling private conduct in our government. But
neither government was limited in its power only to statutory enactments; it
is also accepted (and thus implicit) that the courts were another source of
judgments that are binding on individual liberty. Even in the absence of
positive legislation, American courts were thus understood to be able to
devise rules of decision that could govern private behavior by specifying
what can and cannot be done within the bounds of the common law devel-
oped by the judges themselves.15 Quite a large body of common law al-
ready existed, encompassing the terms of contracts and rights of property,
and devising the details of civil wrongs (tort law) and criminal violations.
Without the state legislatures or the Congress even breathing a word on
these subjects, the judicial process provided a means of ordering private
conduct in these areas.
But this prompts an immediate question: do both federal and state
courts have this implicit judicial authority to the same extent? If federal
courts can develop their own federal common law, then are we still adher-
ing to the principles of a limited federal government that governs citizens
only in the areas of enumerated legislative power?
In the first few decades of the new republic, the federal courts an-
swered this question in different ways. It seems to me that one of those
answers was right, and the other was wrong. In the field of criminal law, the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts cannot “exercise . . . common
law jurisdiction in criminal cases.”16 The case was one that admittedly
touched on federal interests, since a criminal indictment was brought for
libel against those who published a claim that the President and U.S. Con-
gress had secretly voted a “present” (that is, a bribe) of two million dollars
to Napoleon Bonaparte for leave to make a treaty with Spain.17 Declining to
narrow the grounds of its decision, the Court concluded that the “powers of
the general Government are made up of concessions from the several
states—whatever is not expressly given to the former, the latter expressly
reserve.”18 Since the Congress had not exercised its enumerated powers to
define such an offense or confer such jurisdiction, the federal courts could
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
15. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988).
16. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 32 (1812).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 33.
5
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not invoke the common law to arrogate such power for themselves.19 “The
legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a
punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the
offense.”20
By contrast, when the Supreme Court ultimately reached the question
of whether the federal courts possessed the authority to interpret and apply
federal common law in civil cases—rather than being bound to follow state
law—it erred by holding that they could do so. The issue in Swift v. Tyson21
involved principles of general commercial law.22 The Court rested its hold-
ing on its interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which stated that “the
laws of the several states, except where the [C]onstitution, treaties, or stat-
utes of the United States shall otherwise recognize or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts of the
United States.”23 The Court read this language, rather dubiously, to cover
only the state court interpretation of state statutes, in matters that were “im-
movable and intra-territorial in their nature and character.”24 That decision
opened the floodgates for federal courts to apply federal common law to
plaintiffs engaged in interstate commerce who believed their interests
would be better served by repairing to the federal courts rather than having
their interests determined by the state courts applying potentially more pa-
rochial state common law.
The effects of the ruling were felt for almost a century; from 1842 until
the unfortunate precedent was finally overruled by the Supreme Court in
1938.25 Yet the Judiciary Act should never have been read in this way, and
even if it had, it should have been found unconstitutional insofar as it au-
thorized federal courts to apply federal common law in civil cases even
where no controlling legislation had been enacted pursuant to Congress’s
enumerated powers. Instead, state law (whether grounded in the common
law or state statutes) should have continued to govern all civil matters—
including interstate commercial matters—unless or until a federal law on
the subject had been properly enacted. As the Court ultimately and suc-
cinctly held: “There is no federal general common law.”26 And the Consti-
19. Id.
20. Id. at 34.
21. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
22. Id. at 1–2.
23. Swift, 41 U.S. at 1. With minimal modifications, the same language continues to govern state
laws as rules of decision in civil actions in the federal courts today. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
24. Swift, 41 U.S. at 18.
25. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938).
26. Id. at 78 (as Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, continued: “Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State, whether they be local in their nature or
‘general’ . . . [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts.”).
6
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tution has not granted to either the Congress or the federal courts the power
to authorize it in derogation of state law.
In one other respect, our federal system was also distorted by an unfor-
tunate line of Supreme Court precedents that interfered with the application
of state law. In cases such as Lochner v. New York,27 the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects the liberty of private
contract rights so completely that even state statutes were struck down if
they impaired contracts.28 Over the years, the laws that were invalidated
included child labor laws, unionization laws, maximum-hours laws, mini-
mum-wage laws, and pension laws.29 The arena for state regulation of pri-
vate conduct was thus stunted even at the height of the Progressive Era. Not
only were states prevented from addressing these categories of problems by
passing their own laws, but nothing else could be done about those
problems, based on the constitutional obstacle. Progress gave way to stale-
mate. This too proved to be a wrong turn, as after four decades these prece-
dents were finally and decisively overruled by the New Deal Court.30
What do we learn about the structure of federalism from these cases?
First, they reveal that from the outset of the republic, the substrata of civil
and criminal ordering of individual behavior occurred largely at the state
level. For the first century or more, this occurred through the mechanisms
of the common law, eventually supplemented by a growing body of state
statutes. To the extent that the federal courts interfered with this regime—
either by advancing the doctrine of federal common law or by erecting con-
stitutional barriers to state authority—those efforts were conceptually
flawed and later abandoned. Constitutional review of state social and eco-
nomic measures, especially, became highly deferential.31
27. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
28. Id. at 64–65.
29. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 268, 273–74 (1918) (child labor law); Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161, 171, 179 (1908) (unionization law); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26
(1915) (unionization law); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64 (maximum-hours law); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp.
of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 535, 561 (1923) (minimum-wage law); Railroad Ret. Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295
U.S. 330, 344, 374 (1935) (pension law).
30. The decision marking the turn away from Lochner, though the Supreme Court did not yet
overrule that precedent, was West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the Court
upheld a minimum-wage law. By the end of the next decade, however, the Court was comfortable
declaring, as it upheld a state unionization law, that it had absolutely rejected the “Allgeyer-Lochner-
Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine.” Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwest Iron &
Metal. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
31. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes funda-
mental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”); United States v.
Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or
7
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The remaining legitimate means of constraining state governance was
through legislative action, by statutes enacted within the enumerated pow-
ers of Congress or, increasingly common in recent decades, by Congress
delegating rulemaking authority to federal agencies and executive depart-
ments to supplement its own lawmaking efforts. It is settled that either type
of federal law can have preemptive effect under the Supremacy Clause by
nullifying conflicting state laws.32 Congress can specify the extent of its
intrusion into the realm of state law either by expressly proclaiming its in-
tention to do so (whether by occupying the entire field of conduct or by
specifying a narrower scope of negation) or by detailing a scheme of federal
law that would be undermined or frustrated by conflicting state laws that
interfere with the federal scheme.33
But, crucially, the displacement of state law is to be determined en-
tirely as a matter of congressional intent.34 And though this puts the deter-
mination in the hands of federal officials in the first instance, it is notable
that those legislators often have prior background in state government and
are cautious about exercising their power to restrict the state authority to
govern. In particular, where it is understood that achieving the desired
objectives will require ample attention and resources, they can specify that
the federal and state relationship should take the form of cumulative and
coordinated efforts to serve the same core purposes.
An excellent example is the field of criminal law. Recall that in the
Supreme Court’s early days, it held that federal courts lacked authority to
develop federal common-law principles of crime and punishment. Legisla-
tive action was required to produce federal criminal law.35 But when Con-
gress began to do so, it took pains to make clear that federal criminal law
would not be construed to preempt state criminal law. In the same statute
where it provides that the federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over the laws defining federal criminal offenses, Congress also stated that
nothing in the federal criminal code “shall be held to take away or impair
the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.”36
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”).
32. See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 865 (2000) (state lawsuit imper-
missibly conflicted with federal law and regulation); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (“Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive [sic] effect than federal stat-
utes.”).
33. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[A]nalysis of the scope of the
statute’s pre-emption is guided by our oft-repeated comment . . . that ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touch-stone’ in every pre-emption [sic] case  (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S.
96, 103 (1963)”).
35. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 32–34 (1812).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1948).
8
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As Justice Reed noted, “That declaration springs from the federal character
of our Nation. It recognizes the fact that maintenance of order and fairness
rests primarily with the States. The section was first enacted in 1825 and
has appeared successively in the federal criminal laws since that time.”37
It essentially goes without saying, then, that federal criminal laws are
almost never understood to preempt state criminal laws.38 Even if the defi-
nition of a federal crime conflicts or overlaps with the definition of a state
crime of the same or similar nature, the one traditionally does not nullify
the other.39 Indeed, the congeniality of federal and state criminal law is
made more emphatic by the fact that the courts have long sanctioned paral-
lel prosecutions by federal and state governments for the very same con-
duct, holding also that they do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.40
This seems to reflect an overriding determination that both federal and state
officials shall fulfill their respective roles in maintaining public order and
protecting the public safety—objectives that lie at the core of the nature of
the police power. Over the years, this federal-state relationship has been
further strengthened by accustomed processes that foster close coordination
in many criminal investigations, strategic working groups, and joint task
forces.41
37. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 519 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 443 (1821) (“To interfere with the penal laws of a
State, where they . . . have for their sole object the internal government of the country, is a very serious
measure, which Congress cannot be supposed to adopt lightly or inconsiderately.”). But see Nelson, 350
U.S. at 499 (a state law that prohibits sedition defined as the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the
U.S. government by force and violence is prohibited by a federal criminal law that “proscribes the same
conduct”); cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 76–77 (1959) (no preemption of state law prohibiting
sedition against the state government itself).
39. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 329 (1920) (state criminal law banning interfer-
ence with federal military enlistment is valid and does not conflict with federal law addressing the same
subject because “this country is one composed of many, and must on occasions be animated as one, and
that the constituted and constituting sovereignties must have power of cooperation”); Fox v. Ohio, 46
U.S. 410, 434–35 (1847) (state criminal law prohibiting the counterfeiting of federal money is not
preempted by federal criminal law governing the same act).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (explaining and upholding the “dual
sovereignty” doctrine prior to incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the state govern-
ments); Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1980 (2019) (reaffirming “dual sovereignty” doctrine
after incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
41. See, e.g., William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local Police, 15
CRIME AND JUSTICE 231, 231 (1992) (describing considerable progress that has been made to deepen
connections between federal and nonfederal police through information exchange, technical assistance,
and multijurisdictional operational task forces); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Dual Prosecu-
tions: A Model for Concurrent Federal Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 72, 72
(1996) (empirical analysis of Justice Department’s “Petite policy” for determining when to pursue dual
prosecution of the same matter under federal law after prior state prosecution).
9
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III. APPLICATION TO CONSUMER FINANCE
What does all of this have to do with consumer finance? I would argue
that it sets the parameters for a robust version of federalism that will protect
consumers in the financial marketplace. The mere fact of dissimilarities or
conflicting provisions in federal and state law, even governing the same
categories of conduct, need not result in state law being displaced under the
Supremacy Clause. Of course, private actors who are governed by those
laws will likely complain that they are being subjected to confusing, dupli-
cative, and burdensome obligations. And they will have a point: it is much
easier to comply with one set of standards than with multiple discordant
sources of coercion. But there is no constitutional mandate of the greatest
simplicity in governing a federal republic. Companies, and individuals, al-
ready comply with distinct and overlapping legal regimes governing taxa-
tion, property rights, contract terms, torts, conditions of employment, and
many other items. We have parallel federal and state antitrust laws, securi-
ties laws, and unfair competition laws. How federal and state law should
intersect in consumer finance, as in any other area of law, depends entirely
on what Congress has to say.
And in the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress spoke very clearly by declaring
for the same kind of vigorous federalism in protecting consumers in the
financial marketplace that it has provided in the realm of criminal law. It
did so by embracing language that evoked the provisions quoted earlier
from the FDCPA. In a section entitled “Relation to State Law,” Congress
stated that the entire Consumer Financial Protection Act, except in a few
limited particulars, “may not be construed as annulling, altering, or affect-
ing, or exempting any person subject to [its provisions] from complying
with the statutes, regulations, orders, or interpretations in effect in any
State, except to the extent that any such provision of law is inconsistent
with the provisions of this [Act], and then only to the extent of the inconsis-
tency.”42 This, again, is a careful and narrow preemption provision. But
almost immediately it is narrowed further, by specifying that “a statute,
regulation, order, or interpretation in effect in any State is not inconsistent
with the provisions of this [Act] if the protection that such statute, regula-
tion, order, or interpretation affords to consumers is greater than the protec-
tion provided under this [Act.]”43 In other words, state consumer financial
law is valid even if it conflicts with federal consumer financial law, so long
as it goes further toward the same fundamental objective of protecting con-
sumers in the financial marketplace.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a)(1) (2010).
43. 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a)(2) (2010).
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To make an analogy to constitutional law, Congress here is speaking
the language of “rights.” The candid principle can be restated to say that
consumers have a right to greater financial protection, and it does not matter
if it emanates from federal or state sources. More “rights” are better, and if
that occurs because federal law so extends them, then all well and good, but
if states wish to extend them still further, they are free to do so. This is
comparable to the fundamental principle of state constitutional law—that
rights are a “one-way ratchet,” and if state constitutions seek to expand
even the same or similar individual rights beyond their federal counterparts,
the resulting limitations on the powers of their state governments will be
upheld, despite any apparent substantive conflict.44
Congress thus provided a meta-principle of interpretation here, which
has the effect of overriding standard preemption analysis by stipulating that
the matter at issue is so important that the combined efforts of federal and
state law are to be prized even at the cost and confusion of the difficulties
they may create for private individuals in conducting their affairs. This
principle bolsters the concurrent nature of federalism in consumer finance.
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act contains another unusual provision
that authorizes state attorneys general as well as state regulators to bring
appropriate actions “to enforce provisions of [the Consumer Financial Pro-
tection Act] or regulations issued under this [Act]” and “to secure remedies
under provisions of this [Act] or remedies otherwise provided under other
provisions of law with respect to such an entity.”45 In other words, state
officials are granted the authority directly to enforce federal law, along with
their federal counterparts. To underscore the collegial nature of the ways
that federal and state officials are intertwined in their work, Congress ena-
bled a majority of states to petition the CFPB to initiate proceedings to
establish or modify consumer protection regulations and laid out a process
for state officials to notify and consult with the CFPB whenever they decide
to file an action to enforce federal consumer financial law.46
Why would Congress push so hard to insist on cooperative federalism
to this degree in the realm of consumer finance? One reason may be a frank
recognition that enforcing fairness in the marketplace, as a means of pro-
moting the general welfare, has always been at the heart of the police power
reserved to the states.47 For over a century, this task was accomplished
44. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (describing how state constitutional provisions on the same subject can
extend greater protection of individual rights against state governments than is conferred by the analo-
gous provisions of the U.S. Constitution).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1) (2010).
46. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5551(c), 5552(b) (2010).
47. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (expounding on the police power
reserved to the states and noting: “Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle
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mostly by state judges applying the common law of fraud—which, as codi-
fied in a great variety of federal and state statutes and regulations, is still the
primary basis for most consumer financial law—though the narrower limi-
tations imposed by the common law were loosened over time by state stat-
utes defining unfair and deceptive practices that were deemed necessary to
provide greater protection against economic oppression and injustice.48 Le-
gal and political theorists have long affirmed that consent freely given,
which is a basic principle regulating private conduct in a market-based eco-
nomic system that rests on consumer choice, is vitiated by force and
fraud.49 Just as Congress has long preserved a robust system of federalism
for criminal law, so it may find it warranted today to ensure a similarly
potent form of federalism for consumer financial law.
The expanded role of consumer finance in our everyday lives over the
past two generations, due to the financialization of the economy, has corre-
spondingly increased the vulnerability of individual consumers of house-
hold credit and payment products.50 At the time when the Dodd-Frank Act
was passed, Congress was enacting more than 150 pages of additional fed-
eral statutes and authorizing a new federal agency to focus on this subject
and write additional regulations. In light of those developments, Congress
no doubt found it advisable to go out of its way to state clearly its intention
to maintain all the same protections of state law, without letting them be
sacrificed, consciously or inadvertently, in the name of conflict preemption.
Joint enforcement of consumer financial law by federal and state offi-
cials has become the norm in this field. It can be extremely hard to link
arms across the separate spaces created by different parts and levels of our
government. Those efforts encounter tremendous logistical and cultural
challenges, the reality of distinct duties and responsibilities, and the natural
impulse to preserve and protect one’s own turf unobstructed. The Federal
Trade Commission had paved the way for many years through its practice
which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or
his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.”); cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S.
497, 519 (1956) (Reed, J., dissenting) (“the maintenance of order and fairness rests primarily with the
States”).
48. See generally Carolyn Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Evaluation of
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Laws, NCLC.ORG (Mar. 2018), https://perma.cc/9BVG-79Q6.
49. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. Snow, 13 N.E. 596, 598 (Mass. 1887) (the effect on a contract is the
same whether consent is induced by duress or fraud, for “whether it springs from a fear or from a belief,
the party has been subjected to an improper motive for action”); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, Second Treatise § 181 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (“For whether by force he begins the injury,
or else having quietly and by fraud done the injury, he refuses to make reparation, and by force main-
tains it, (which is the same thing as at first to have done it by force) ’tis unjust use of force that [puts a
man into the state of war].”).
50. See RICHARD CORDRAY, WATCHDOG: HOW PROTECTING CONSUMERS CAN SAVE OUR FAMILIES,
OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR DEMOCRACY 17–18, 32–33 (2020).
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of conducting “sweeps” aimed at specific categories of consumer abuse and
inviting state and local officials to join them in announcing either parallel or
coordinated actions.51 The Justice Department took this kind of coordina-
tion to new heights with the national mortgage servicing settlement, a
mega-action that overhauled an entire industry and provided tens of billions
of dollars in consumer redress for fraudulent conduct by the big banks.52
The CFPB took its cue from these antecedents and mounted blanket efforts
to strategize and work closely with both state attorneys general and state
financial regulators. Many of its enforcement actions involved state part-
ners, ranging from solitary officials to larger matters that garnered partici-
pation from all fifty states.53 Furthermore, Congress’s decision to authorize
the states to enforce federal consumer financial law has looked positively
prescient in the current era, which has seen a retreat from aggressive activ-
ity by the CFPB and other federal agencies.54
Another reason to preserve the protections of state law is the recogni-
tion that the historic grounds of consumer financial protection, before the
modern era of federal attention, rested chiefly on state law as declared and
interpreted in private actions. Again, the federal role really started with the
Federal Trade Commission’s enforcement of unfair competition law and
later was greatly expanded by Congress as it has passed dozens of con-
sumer financial laws since 1968.55 But government enforcement of con-
sumer financial law has always been strongly supplemented by a mass of
private litigation, mostly under state law but now increasingly under federal
law. That longstanding source of consumer financial law is now threatened,
however, by the Supreme Court’s demolition of private litigation through
51. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, FTC, State, and Federal Law Enforcement Partners An-
nounce Nationwide Crackdown on Phantom and Abusive Debt Collection, FTC.GOV (Sept. 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7LKG-Z2RC (announcing more than 50 coordinated enforcement actions taken by fed-
eral and state officials).
52. See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25
Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and
Foreclosure Abuses, JUSTICE.GOV (Feb. 9, 2012), https://perma.cc/AWB7-TRXV.
53. See, e.g., Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB, State Authorities Order Ocwen to
Provide $2 Billion in Relief to Homeowners for Servicing Wrongs, CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (Dec. 19,
2013), https://perma.cc/KRM8-C5RQ. See generally Christopher Lewis Peterson, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1096 (2016)
(analyzing first four years of CFPB enforcement actions and finding that virtually all consumer relief
was obtained in cases involving collaboration with other state or federal law enforcement partners).
54. See, e.g., U.S. House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on Financial Services, Set-
tling for Nothing: How Kraninger’s CFPB Leaves Consumers High and Dry, FINANCIALSER-
VICES.HOUSE.GOV 7–8 (Oct. 2019), https://perma.cc/4GT2-4KDT (“Enforcement Activity Declines Dra-
matically Under Trump-Appointed Leadership”).
55. See Andrea Ryan, Gunnar Trumbull & Peter Tufano, A Brief Postwar History of U.S. Consumer
Finance, 85 BUS. HIST. REV. 461, 488 (2011) (listing approximately forty key legal events, mostly
legislative enactments, in consumer finance between 1968–2009, prior to enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act).
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its creative and expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act.56 The
CFPB sought to walk back the use of arbitration clauses to override private
rights of action by adopting a regulation that would have preserved con-
sumer class actions, but this initiative was defeated in the Congress in 2017
by a margin of one vote in the Senate.57 These restrictions on private litiga-
tion have struck a great blow to consumer financial protection. This devel-
opment further amplifies the need for federal and state officials to work
closely together to make the best possible use of their limited resources to
address the acknowledged problem of “under-enforcement” of these laws.58
At the same time, Congress went further in the Dodd-Frank Act, by
frankly encouraging and inviting the states to do even more if they thought
greater consumer financial protections would be justified to look out for the
welfare of their own citizens. A growing number of states are accepting that
invitation. Several states have enacted statutes to address the problem of
student loan servicing, which has been an area where federal action has
diminished.59 California has just passed a new law requiring debt collectors
to be licensed in order to corral abuses.60 More states are considering or
adopting laws to rein in high-cost payday lending, even as the CFPB is
seeking to roll back the regulation that had imposed the first-ever federal
controls on this industry.61 And less than a month ago (in fact, the signing
56. See, e.g., Colorado Proposition 111, Limits on Payday Loan Charges, BALLOTOPIA.ORG (2018),
https://perma.cc/A89Z-XSGF (same; passed with 77% of the vote); South Dakota Payday Lending Initi-
ative, Initiated Measure 21, BALLOTOPIA.ORG (2016), https://perma.cc/5WTR-FLDB (voter-initiated bal-
lot measure proposed to impose a 36% interest rate cap on payday loans; passed with 76% of the vote).
57. See CORDRAY, supra note 50, at 193–98 (discussing the arbitration rule and how it was overrid-
den by Congress under the Congressional Review Act); see also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act § 1028(a), FILES.CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (Mar. 2015), https://perma.cc/FA7G-JGWM
(exhaustive study commissioned by Congress on the nature and use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in the field of consumer finance).
58. See, e.g., Jenny Tansey, Voices from the Corporate Enforcement Gap, PUBLIC RIGHTS PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/85C5-W2UX (July 2019) (identifying and describing underutilized authority of state
and local governments to vindicate public rights).
59. See, e.g., An Act Concerning a Student Loan Bill of Rights, P.A. NO. 15-162 (Conn. 2015)
(codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36a-846 to 36a-854); Student Loan Servicing Rights Act, P.A. NO.
100-540 (Ill. 2017) (codified at 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 992/1-1 to 99-99); Student Loan Servicing, A.B.
NO. 376 (Cal. 2019) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE, Div. 3, Part 4, Title 1.6C.10).
60. This measure passed the legislature on August 31, 2020. See Debt Collection Licensing Act,
S.B. NO. 908 (Cal. 2020) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE, Div. 25).
61. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (same even where
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery);
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 preempts
state laws that forbid agreements to forestall class action arbitration). See generally, CORDRAY, supra
note 50, at 198–204, 207–09 (recounting background to CFPB’s adoption of federal “ability to repay”
rule applicable to payday and motor vehicle title loans and further controversies over its implementa-
tion); Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,472 (Nov. 17,
2017) (federal payday regulation adopted); Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment
Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382 (July 22, 2020) (rescinding portions of prior regulation).
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ceremony will be held later today), the California General Assembly
adopted a major overhaul measure to transform its current Department of
Business Oversight into a new Department of Financial Protection and In-
novation, with a new pro-consumer mission, expanded powers, and com-
prehensive oversight over all types of consumer financial products and ser-
vices without regard to licensing.62
IV. CONCLUSION
Federalism as a practical concept comprises a set of arrangements and
doctrines about the structure and powers of different levels of government.
In itself, federalism is a neutral principle that can be used or misused in
different areas and distinct historical contexts. At the time of the Founding,
it emerged as an ingenious solution to the problem of creating and main-
taining a large commercial republic. It has helped secure and preserve indi-
vidual liberties against the growing threat posed by a strong central govern-
ment. But it also has long impeded this country’s progress toward broader
and more universal civil rights. Here we have traced aspects of its develop-
ment in yet another area, where it may prove to have beneficent effects in
bolstering the role and status of the individual in our common market econ-
omy. In the field of consumer finance, at least, we can see that the enduring
principles of American federalism remain vital and vibrant.
62. See California Consumer Financial Protection Law, A.B. NO. 1864 (Cal. 2020) (codified at
CAL. FIN. CODE, Div. 24).
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